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Abstract
Large military platforms have encountered major performance and reliability
issues due to an increased number of incidents with counterfeit electronic parts. This has
drawn the attention of Department of Defense (DOD) leadership making detection and
avoidance of counterfeit electronic parts a top issue for national defense. More defined
regulations and processes for identifying, reporting, and disposing of counterfeit
electronic parts are being revised to raise awareness for this issue, as well as enhance the
detection of these parts. Multiple technologies are currently employed throughout the
supply chain to detect counterfeit electronic parts. These methods are often costly, timeconsuming, and destructive. This research investigates a non-destructive test method that
collects radiated electromagnetic emissions from functional devices using a commercially
available system, the APREL EM-ISight. A design of experiments (DOE) is created and
executed to determine the significant system factors and interactions. These factors are
then optimized for the desired responses. The sensitivity of the system is analyzed by
scanning a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) field-programmable gate array (FPGA) at
the optimized factor levels established from the DOE and varying the programmed
signal. This research established the viability of using APREL’s EM-ISight to detect a
device’s inherent electromagnetic signature by successfully identifying a defective board
and characterizing the process variations of multiple boards. Another conclusion of this
research is the tradeoff between resolution and scan time.
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INVESTIGATION OF ELECTROMAGNETIC SIGNATURES OF A FPGA
USING AN APREL EM-ISIGHT SYSTEM
I. Introduction
General Issue
Over the last 15 years, an increasing number of counterfeit electronic parts have
become a critical issue for both industry and the Department of Defense (DOD)
(Aerospace Industries Association, 2011). Everything from discrete electronic
components and integrated circuits (ICs) to circuit boards are at risk. Based on the
Defense Industrial Base Assessment: Counterfeit Electronics, a counterfeit part is not
genuine if any of the following five criteria are met (U.S. Department of Commerce,
2010). It:
1. is an unauthorized copy
2. does not conform to original OCM* design, model, and/or performance
standards
3. is not produced by the OCM or is produced by unauthorized contractors
4. is an off-specification, defective, or used OCM product sold as “new” or
working
5. has incorrect or false markings and/or documentation
*
OCM refers to the Original Component Manufacturer.
The total value of counterfeit electronic parts in the G20 economy was forecasted
to cost between $1.2 and $1.7 trillion in 2015 (International Chamber of Commerce,
2011). In addition to the projected costs, security, safety, and reliability topics are other
prime concerns associated with counterfeit electronic parts. The cost value of recycled
and remarked parts is estimated to contribute to over 80% of all counterfeit parts in
circulation (Kessler & Sharpe, 2010). U.S. companies were found to be largely unaware
of any legal requirements or liabilities for the disposal of parts (U.S. Department of
1

Commerce, 2010). This ignorance in the US permitted electronic waste to be shipped to
China for disposal. These shipments created a new market for organized crime and
entrepreneurialship through disassembly and overhauling of components. Hence, China is
the leading source for counterfeit components. These devices often make their way back
into the hands of the consumer unnoticed. This research focuses on the detection of
reused counterfeit parts using a proposed new method of scanning to detect a variation in
the 3-D electromagnetic signature at the board level.
Problem Statement
Counterfeit electronic parts are infiltrating major program systems resulting in
compromised integrity that degrades system reliability and performance. It is desirable to
be able to test electronic parts to identify counterfeit electronic parts in a nondestructive,
cost and time efficient manner with a high level of confidence. Analyzing a part’s unique
electromagnetic signature using APREL’s EM-ISight automated system is hypothesized
to be a novel way to accomplish this task.
Research Questions
The research questions below addresses the overall focus of this thesis.
-

What are counterfeit electronic parts?

-

How can counterfeit electronic parts be detected?

-

How can reused electronic parts be detected?

Investigative Questions
The following investigative questions support the study of the research question.
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-

Can counterfeit electronic parts be detected using the part’s unintentional
electromagnetic signature?

-

How effective is the APREL EM-ISight at detecting counterfeit electronic
parts?

-

What is the optimal test setup to detect counterfeit electronic parts?

-

How repeatable are the test results?

Research Focus
The scope of this research focuses primarily on item four in the general issue
discussion above, “an off-specification, defective, or used OCM product sold as “new” or
working” (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2010). A commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
board containing a field programmable gate array (FPGA) is the circuit board utilized for
testing the inherent electromagnetic signature. Every device produces an internal
electromagnetic emission (EME). Often, these emissions interfere with other parts on the
board and a unique electromagnetic signature is created. The FPGA can be
reprogrammed to allow for a potential new electromagnetic signature based on
component functionality. These signatures are collected and analyzed using the APREL
EM-ISight system.
Methodology Overview
The methodology implemented for this research is a three step process. The first
step researches current counterfeit parts detection techniques in Chapter II. The second
phase is composed of conducting several tests. In this phase a design of experiments
(DOE) is implemented to optimize the test routine. Then, a comparative study is
3

conducted between several COTS boards to determine manufacturing process variations.
A sensitivity analysis is also accomplished to determine the system boundaries for
identifying minor deviations. The third and final stage is a comprehensive analysis of all
the data collected to determine the effectiveness of an electromagnetic signature in
determining a counterfeit part.
Assumptions/Limitations
The most significant assumption in this research is that the circuit boards
examined in this thesis are “known good” parts and are indeed not a counterfeit. Having
an untampered new part is imperative to the baseline results. The only verification of this
assumption was optical examination and inspection of the parts and documentation upon
arrival. One limitation of the unit of analysis, in this research, is the chip and not
individual components. With the emphasis placed at the chip level, a variation in the
electromagnetic signature can occur due to one or more components or a combination of
components being reused, damaged, or failing.
Another limitation potentially involves the capability of the equipment used to
detect counterfeit parts. An electric field (E-field) is the amount of electric force per unit
charge. Electric fields can be created by the change in magnetic fields. A magnetic field
(H-field) is the force on moving a charge. Magnetic fields are produced by the flow of
electrons that create a current. Both fields show the behavior of an operational device and
exhibit how signals and waves propagate inside the device. The EM-ISight tool is limited
to a 0.03 mm spatial resolution for the E and H-field probes. The frequency range is also
limited based on the probe, low noise amplifier (LNA), and spectrum analyzer. The probe
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selected in this research has a maximum frequency range of 6 GHz. In this case, the study
will only use a frequency range of 50 MHz to 550 MHz.
Implications
The ability to detect reused counterfeit parts sold as new will be useful for both
industry and DOD. The National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) defined the
procurement process, and more specifically the detection and avoidance of used
counterfeit parts, as one of their top issues in 2014 (National Defense Industrial
Association, 2014). The financial liability for the repair or replacement of counterfeit
electronic parts is a major concern since the parts are usually introduced several levels
deep in the supply chain. These liabilities can often bankrupt small businesses. This test
procedure could be an effective way to determine the authenticity of devices currently
implemented in major programs without destroying the unit. In addition, it could be a
way to determine the health status of the system after use in stressful test conditions. This
can aid in the lifetime maintenance and functionality of the overall system.
Preview
The remainder of this research is divided into four additional chapters. Chapter II
provides a literature review of current counterfeit detection techniques and recent tests on
electromagnetic emission and signature variations and their causes. Chapter III delivers a
detailed methodology of the research and test protocol. Chapter IV discusses the analysis
and results drawn from the data collection. Chapter V concludes the thesis with
recommendations acquired from this research and new opportunities for future research.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
Chapter II focuses on several topics of interest for this research including (1) the
effect of counterfeit parts on the government, industry, and consumers; (2) current
methods for detecting counterfeit parts; (3) preventative measures to deter counterfeiting;
(4) recent research on electromagnetic emissions and signatures; and (5) a brief overview
of the APREL EM-ISight tool. The first topic discusses major concerns and vital statistics
regarding counterfeit items that plague the electronics world. The second subject
discusses, in more detail, the approaches currently used to identify counterfeit parts. The
third item examines some of the procedures, policies, and new device technology that are
being implemented to make new parts less susceptible to counterfeiting and to prevent
the purchasing of counterfeit items. The fourth topic investigates research topics and
current results from electromagnetic emission/signature tests. Finally, an overview of the
system utilized in this research will be described.
Statistics and Impacts from Counterfeit Parts
The government has tracked and reported the increase of electronic counterfeit
parts over the past 15 years. The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) assessment
focused on five segments of the supply chain – the Original Component Manufacturer
(OCM), distributors and brokers, circuit board assemblers, prime
contractors/subcontractors, and DOD agencies; that investigated 387 companies and
organizations over a three year period between 2005 to 2008 (U.S. Department of
Commerce, 2010). Over this time period, the BIS documented the annual number of
6

counterfeit electronic incidents across the industry rose from 3,868 to 9,356. Out of the
387 companies and organizations investigated, 39% encountered counterfeits at least
once during this time period. The majority of these incidents occurred at the OCM level
of the supply chain and were typically found in microcircuits, as opposed to discrete
devices like capacitors, resistors, and inductors. A notable concern is the increase in the
number of incidents on the Qualified Products List (QPL) and Qualified Manufacturers
List (QML). Over three years, the number of incidents increased tenfold. This is a
concern since many DOD entities purchase items from this approved list and about 60%
of the authorized distributors had an incident with counterfeit electronics (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 2010).
From a 2009 survery, conducted by the US. Department of Commerce, 55% of
distributors used internal, contractor, or both types of testing facilities to detect
counterfeit parts. In the other segments of the supply chain less than 55% of companies
conduct testing for counterfeit products, with only 11% of board assemblers completing
testing. Used products, marked as new or higher grade, account for the majority of
incidents found during the survey. The survey also found most of these products came
from China at every level of the supply chain.
Counterfeit electronic parts are making their way through the supply chain and
into consumers’ hands. Starting with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development’s (OECD) original estimates from their 2005 data, the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) launched a business initiative in 2011 called the Business
Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP) to estimate the global econmic and
social impacts caused by counterfeiting and piracy. They estimated in 2015 the total
7

value of counterfeit and pirated products for the G20 economies will be between $1.2 and
$1.7 trillion dollars. Furthermore, 2.5 million jobs have already been lost due to
counterfeiting and piracy (International Chamber of Commerce, 2011).
There are various impacts to government, industry, and consumers from the
introduction of counterfeit products. National security and safety are the primary
concerns for the U.S. Government, in addition to loss of tax revenues. Counterfiet
electronic parts found in companies cause damage to their business image and ultimately
lead to a loss of sales and an imposed cost to replace failed parts and mitigate the risk of
future encounters. After customers insert counterfeit items into their intended system,
associated costs due to failure, lower quality, or poor reliability can escalate the
maintenance and/or replacement cost. Degraded performance is a leading concern to the
end user (Rostami, Koushanfar, & Karri, 2014). When faulty parts are placed in major
vehicles, such as a satellite, a whole program/mission can be terminated when a single
part fails. Additionally, safety is always a prime concern, especially on manned
platforms. Counterfeit electronic parts pose a threat to every person, company, and
platform that interacts with the item (Aerospace Industries Association, 2011).
Detection Methods
Current counterfeit parts can be categorized into two major types of defects: (1)
physical defects and (2) electrical defects (Guin, DiMase, & Tehranipoor, 2014). Physical
defects can be detected by optically inspecting the exterior of the part for labeling
inconsistencies, damaged leads or bonds, dimension analysis, blacktop testing, etc.
Interior tests such as material analysis, X-Ray scans, de-lidding, Scanning Acoustic
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Microscopy (SAM), Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM), and Raman Spectroscopy are
examples of the standard practices to find physical defects in counterfeit parts. Electrical
defects are more difficult to detect and often require extensive characterization to
determine if the item is a counterfeit. Group A testing is comprised of a “device’s full
functional and parametric requirements at the recommended manufacturer’s or specific
industry extreme operating temperatures” (Frederico, 2009). In addition to Group A
testing, burn-in tests and accelerated life testing is utilized to predict device performance.
Taxonomies of counterfeit component types, the detection methods, and
defects/anomalies found in counterfeit electronic components are included in Appendix A
(Guin, DiMase, & Tehranipoor, 2014).
A major focus is being placed on stricter standards, trusted supply chain
assurance, certification testing, secure/anti-tamper chips, and new device identification
methods. However, this research concentrates on investigating a robust technique for
detecting counterfeit parts, especially for identifying functional, reused parts that are
most likely labeled at a higher quality than the manufacturer originally intended. It uses a
non-destructive and cost effective method to collect and compare parts’ radiated
emissions to identify major changes in the parts tested.
Before Buying Parts
Before buying parts, several tasks can be completed to ensure the purchase is
from a reliable source. If possible, replacement parts should be purchased from the OCM
or Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). Simple tactics such as reviewing “product
documentation, shippers, etc. in excruciating detail” prior to acquisition can help
safeguard against buying counterfeit parts (Lowry, 2007). Watching for misspellings,
9

grammar issues, abnormal expressions, and wrong information when compared to
original product documentation can be indications of a counterfeit supplier. Another
warning sign when looking up items online are short-lived websites. This is a good
indicator that the supplier is illegitimate. A way to confirm this suspicion is to utilize
either an internal or public Qualified Suppliers List for Distributors (QSLD) or a
Qualified Suppliers List for Manufacturers (QSLM) (Aerospace Industries Association,
2011).
External Visual Inspection and Testing
Upon receipt, regardless of the supply chain level, external visual inspection is
typically the quickest and least expensive method to detect simple counterfeiting
techniques. For example, basic inconsistencies in logo, part number, documentation (or
lack thereof), shipping material, spelling errors, and legibility are obvious clues the part
has been tampered with and is most likely a counterfeit. If the part passes a rudimentary
optical inspection a more detailed investigation can be completed. Physical defects such
as dimensions, corrosion, color, lead straightness, and electrostatic discharge (ESD)
damage may indicate improper handling or reuse of parts (Lowry, 2007; Guin et al.,
2014; Frederico, 2009).
A more thorough investigation of the part includes checking for signs of sanding,
blacktopping, and marking permancy. Blacktopping can consist of sanding packaged
devices down and then applying an epoxy with the shavings to create a new coating on
the package. It is then typically painted black (the color of the package) and then printing
a new logo to the exterior. One indicator of a counterfeit part is if the logo is smudged,
coming off, or partially gone. Using certain slovents can often times remove labels or the
10

blacktopping to show the original package. Figure 1 shows two characteristics of
counterfeit parts.

Figure 1 Example of lead tampering (left) and blacktopping (right).
(In Compliance, 2010)
Non-Destructive Imaging and Testing
Inspecting a part without destroying it is preferred when selecting a detection
method for the sake of reporting the part, getting a second opinion, or actually using the
component if it is a non-counterfeit part. In addition to testing, there are a number of nondestructive imaging techniques used to inspect the wire bonding of the pins and conduct a
material analysis. A common practice is X-ray analysis which allows the user to look
through the component’s package to inspect the internal structure of the part including
the workmanship, location, and size or wire bonds (Lowry, 2007; Guin et al., 2014;
Frederico, 2009).

Figure 2 X-Ray images of four identically marked components showing different
internal structures. (In Compliance, 2010)
11

A number of costly, yet effective, microscopy scans can be conducted to
determine the authenticity of an electronic part. These techniques include scanning
acoustic microscopy (SAM), scanning electron microscopy (SEM), energy-dispersive Xray spectroscopy (EDXRS), Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR), energydispersive X-ray fluorescence (EDXRF), and Raman spectroscopy. Although many of
these techniques are non-destructive, they can include some sample preparation in order
to characterize the device effectively. Some of the preparations include de-lidding, decapping, thinning, or coating samples. SAM refers to a technology that transmits an
ultrasound wave through a medium and the reflected signal can be detected, processed,
and developed into an image (Delta, 2015). In SEM analysis, a focused beam of highenergy electrons produces a variety of signals from a sample. The interaction from this
beam can create an image of the topography, “the external morphology, chemical
composition, crystalline structure, and orientation of materials that make up the sample”
(Frederico, 2009). EDXRS uses X-ray excitation interaction with the sample to
determine the chemical characterization or elemental analysis of a sample. FTIR uses a
Fouirer transform to convert raw data into a spectrum in order to identify organic or
inorganic chemicals that elude to the type of polymer, coating, or contaminant on the
device (Frederico, 2009). EDXRF is similar to EDXRS except that a detector is used to
convert X-ray energy into voltage signals and then processed and analyzed into data to be
able to characaterize individual particles. Raman spectroscopy uses the scattering of light
to observe vibrational modulation which ultimately characterizes material and
crystallographic orientation of a sample. All of these techniques are beneficial and used
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under certain circumstances. Table 11 in Appendix A depicts which test methods detect
certain types of defects identifed in the different types of counterfeit electronic parts.
Destructive Imaging and Testing
When non-destructive testing is inconclusive, destructive procedures can be
employed. An easy test to conduct is a hermiticity test on packaged parts. This test
checks a supposedly sealed package for any leaks (Guin et al., 2014; Lowry, 2007). Decapsulation/de-lidding allows the internal design to be inspected and check for any flaws
or unprofessional workmanship in the bonding process. Focused ion beam (FIB) images
often consist of some type of etch and/or deposition of material from/to the sample in
order to obtain an appropriate image.
Electrical testing is one of the best ways to verify if a part is either good or faulty.
Basic functional and parametric tests should be conducted based on the manufacturer’s
operational conditions (Lowry, 2007; Guin et al., 2014; Frederico, 2009). An initial burnin test ensures the reliability of the device. Operating the part at an elevated temperature
induces a ceratin amount of stress on that part. This test can easily detect defective or
lower grade parts (Guin et al., 2014). Accelerated life testing (ALT) is a time consuming
endevor for quality parts. Month-long tests are run to determine functional performance
and operational conditions. It stresses the device at high voltage(s) and temperature(s).
This testing rapidly ages and degrades the device. Early failures can be characaterized
into specific failure modes as shown in Figure 35 of Appendix A.
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Avoidance Methods
Today, emphasis is being placed on exhaustive processes, trusted supply chain
assurance, certification testing, new device identification, and anti-tamper designs.
Raising awareness and new technological designs are imperative to ensure the security
and integrity of quality parts, as well as decrease the number of counterfeit items
reproduced or repurposed. Whether a company is purchasing or fabricating products,
there is a secure process to follow to help ensure the reliability of those components. Both
of these topics will be discussed in more detail.
Awareness and Process Countermeasures
Increased awareness on the part of manufacturers, government agencies, and
consumers is vital to reducing the number of counterfeit parts in everyday products and
major programs (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2010). The Aerospace Industires
Association (AIA) special report on counterfeit parts suggests a number of options that
could be adopted or implemted to bring attention to this issue and some practices to
ensure quality parts. The report includes topics such as “procurement, reporting,
disposition, obsolescence and electronic waste” (Aerospace Industries Association,
2011). Adopting a standard such as AS5553 – Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance,
Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition allows for uniformity across the industry and
helps mitigate the risk of purchasing and installing counterfeit items. If a standard process
is not implemented, developing and/or instating an internal purchasing process would
help reduce risk as well. This process should include a review of approved
manufactures/suppliers through a QSLD/QSLM and reports of suspected counterfeit parts
through a database such as Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP).
14

Training employees is an important factor in fortifying a compnay’s ability to
identify couterfeit parts. Applying an inspection checklist encompassing visual checks,
electrical tests, investigative imagery, and other procedures upon arrival of new items
will allow supply chains and consumers to increase the liklihood of finding a counterfeit
part prior to installation. Documenting these procedures, in addition to a list of
screened/approved suppliers, component pedigrees, and lifcycle analysis tools in a
control plan is a good practice for companies to prepare. This allows the company to
evaluate component obsolescence when making major design decisions. During this
process, if a counterfeit part is found, it is essential to report this issue with an unbiased
reporting organization such as GIDEP. Not only do they document the item, but they
allow the manufacturer to investigate the claim. The AIA report stresses that the company
does not return the suspicious part to the vendor. If it is a counterfeit it will just get
recirculated. Therefore, in this case it is recommended that the part be destroyed.
(Aerospace Industries Association, 2011).
Technical Countermeasures
Technology is quickly evolving to ensure the security of electronic devices to
compete against the growing counterfeit trade. Unique identifiers can be integrated at the
chip or package level. At the chip level, Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) use
unique intrinsic features from a circuit as identification. PUFs exploit basic process
variations, both physical and environmental, that exist in ICs which are unpredictable and
uncontrollable (Wang and Tehranipoor, 2010). These unique features are easy to create
but almost impossible to duplicate, making them ideal for anti-tamper applications. These
embedded signatures are all stored in a vendor’s secure database for future comparison.
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Intellectual property (IP) rights are playing a major role in keeping ICs secure and
protected. Techniques like hardware metering and Secure Split Test (SST) rely on IP
rights. Hardware metering makes a small part of the design programmable at the time of
configuration and then must be configured at the manufacturer. This process creates a
unique chip ID that is difficult to reverse engineer (Koushanfar and Qu, 2001). Active
metering locks every device until it is unlocked by the IP holder. Similar to hardware
metering, “SST reestablishes trust into the IC fabrication and test process by
reintroducing the IP owner in the IC testing procedure without requiring them to be
physically present at the foundry/assembly” (Contreras, Rahman and Tehranipoor, 2013).
Both procedures help prevent different types of counterfeit items.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has initiated several
programs to improve the trustworthiness and reliability of electronic parts. Three main
programs include Trusted Integrated Circuits (TRUST), Integrity and Reliability of
Integrated Circuits (IRIS), and Supply Chain Hardware Integrity for Electronics Defense
(SHIELD). TRUST focused on a metrics based approach where contractors would
determine the probability of detection versus the probability of false alarms. This method
considered all changes to the IC, not only malicious attacks (DARPA TRUST, 2015).
Due to globaliztion of the IC market, many companies have shifted their
production lines to offshore foundries. This shift has led to a lack of regulation that opens
a door for malicious attacks and counterfeit ICs to be integrated into a design that do not
meet performance and reliability specifications. IRIS seeks to develop new techniques
that will non-destructively derive the function of digital, analog, and mixed-signal ICs.
Also, the program “will produce methods of device modeling and analytic proccesses to
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determine the reliability of an IC by testing a limited number of samples” (DARPA IRIS,
2015).
The surge in counterfeit parts has raised the question of security and integrity of
electronic systems in the DOD. The DARPA SHIELD program focuses on creating a new
anti-tamper “dielet” that can be inserted into the package of an IC. The dielet will act as
identification as well as detect any attempt to access or reverse engineer the dielet
(DARPA SHIELD, 2015).
The focus on open foundaries and supply chain assurance is addressed in the
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) Trusted Integrated Chips
(TIC) program. The concept of TIC is to create a split-manufaturing that allows both the
academic world and US industries to have open access to design high performance ICs
while still maintaining the quality and protection throughout the fabrication and
intellectual properties (McCants, 2015).
Another technical measure that can be utilized is scanning a parts electromagnetic
(EM) signature. Every part emits a unique EM signature similar to that of a human
fingerprint. The same types of parts will have similar signatures, but with a natural
variation induced from fabrication. Major variations in the signatures are indications that
the part could be recycled, damaged, have a different fabrication process, or in more
severe circumstances tampered with. The following section goes into more detail on EM
signatures and how it is pertinent to this research.
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Electromagnetic Emissions and Signatures
EM fields are produced through normal current fluctuations during circuit
operation. Tiny process variations induce a slightly different emission to make a
distinctive signature. There are two types of radiated emissions, (1) intentional radiated
emission (IRE) and (2) unintetnional radiated emission (URE). There has been a
multitude of research efforts in the form of RF emissions over the years (Cicchiani,
Hartmuller and Sell, 2008; Montanari, Tacchini and Maini, 2008; Boyer, Ndoye and
Dhia, 2009; I. Montanari, 2005; Boyer, Dhia and Li, 2013; DiBene II and Knighten,
1997; Muccioli, North and Slattery, 1997; Cobb, Lapse and Baldwin, 2011; Cobb, Garcia
and Temple, 2010). Much emphasis has been placed at the device or integrated circuit
level and at a low frequency (below 1 GHz). Research has shown that stress on these
parts--whether temperature, voltage, accelerated life tests, or aging--affect the EM
signature. The EME can often show the signs of aging or failures in a system. Research
completed at the device level determined some of the main failure mechanisms include
time dependent dielectric breakdown (TDDB), hot carrier injection (HCI), and negative
bias temperature instability (HBTI).
Radio frequency distinct native attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprinting is a new way
to identify embedded ICs through the collection of unintentional RF emissions (Cobb et
al., 2010). This leaked information allows operational details of the device performance
and data processing to be inferred (Cobb et al., 2011). The collection of EME is
completed with the use of a near-field probe connected to an oscilloscope or a spectrum
analyzer, depending on the specific type of test. At times, an anechoic chamber is utilized
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to exclude an environmental emissions that would interfere (EMI) with the device or unit
under test (DUT or UUT).
Nokomis Inc. has recently developed a system to identify counterfeit electronic
parts through a part’s URE. The Advanced Detection of Electronic Counterfeits (ADEC)
system uses an ultra-sensitive Hiawatha receiver to form the core of the system. It
currently has a database of 90 different types of parts from 6 distributors. ADEC uses a
part’s URE to identify the part’s authenticity within a 5 second measurement. The system
is still under development (Pathak and Keller, 2013).
APREL EM-ISight Tool
APREL is a Canadian-based company that originated with the development of an
automated Specific Absorption Rate (SAR) test system in 1999 for near field
measurements. SAR is a measure of the amount of RF energy absorbed by the body,
often from a cell phone. In 2011 they released the EM-ISight system which is a flexible
EMI/EMC (electromagnetic compatibility) measurement system. It performs near-field
EM scans of a DUT to produce a 3-D representation of the field spectrum across the
board. Common applications include EMI noise emission analysis, shield placement,
design optimization, and possible susceptibility. Measurements are taken using either an
E or H-field probe that acts as an antenna to collect the EMEs. A spectrum analyzer is
connected to the LNA which interfaces with the EM-ISight system. The advanced
software is used for setting up the test plan, automating data collection over a specified
spectrum, and post-test data analysis. Figure 3 provides a block diagram of the EM-ISight
system.
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Figure 3 EM-ISight Block Diagram
In this research, the EM-ISight tool is employed to take measurements at the
circuit level. A DOE is established and conducted to optimize the set of scanning
parameters to return the best responses for the test. The Methodology section below will
describe details of the individual tests conducted.
Summary
Chapter II summarized several topics of interest for this research. It investigated
the statistics and impacts of counterfeit items on the economy. From there, a variety of
detection and avoidance methods were examined to prevent the implementation of
corrupt parts into major systems. Finally, EM signatures and their susceptibility to
stressful testing and aging were researched. Several methods focused on the failure
mechanisms at the device level. These previous research topics are the foundation for this
research to detect counterfeit items through an EM signature that signifies aging, failure
mechanisms, or counterfeit parts implemented at the board level.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to define the test methodology used to develop a
DOE, collect data, and analyze the overall sensitivity of the system and the average
process variations of the selected devices. The test equipment, selected device, and
descriptions of what each test is composed of is defined and described in this chapter.
Test Equipment
Several systems and COTS software are used in this research. The APREL EMISight is comprised of a Denso robotic arm, a Denso robot controller, a boundary
detection unit (BDU) attached to the arm, an E or H-field probe attached to the BDU, a
low noise amplifier (LNA), a working base with device restraints, a validation microstripline, a laptop that uses the EM-ISight V4.4 software, and various cables as shown in
Figure 4. The majority of this equipment is enclosed in an anechoic chamber to reduce
the effects of emissions of stray charges from other lab equipment.
The APREL software allows the user to setup a test routine for the device under
test (DUT) and automatically control the robotic arm to move throughout the X, Y, Z,
and theta positions. The software collects the spectrum of data through communication
with a Tektronix spectrum analyzer, model RSA6120A. Once all the data is collected the
software features a data analysis capability to complete any post-processing analysis,
including noise floor elimination and a comparative scan application to determine the
differences between two identical scans. A Wiltron signal generator, model 68159B, is
used for daily validation at a manufacturer calibrated frequency, in coordination with the
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appropriate probe and micro-stripline. The validation process is described in more detail
in the Test Setup section below.

Figure 4 Aprel EM-ISight Test Setup (Front View)
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Figure 5 Aprel EM-ISight Test Setup (Top View)
Test Setup
The test setup is composed of several components including the system
validation, board placement, and probe location reference in addition to the system setup
described above. A system validation is done daily using the probe of interest at one of
the specified frequencies recommended by the manufacturer. 300 MHz is the closest
calibrated frequency that matches the center frequency for these tests and was used for all
the system validations. Figure 5 shows these components utilized for the tests.
After system validation, the test article is attached to the base unit to prevent it
from moving during testing. The base unit was fabricated with threaded holes, at equally
spaced intervals, in order to attach test articles directly to the base. Two of these holes, in
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the base, line up directly with two corners of the board selected for testing in this
research. Those two corners are screwed into the base unit to ensure stability. In addition
to the two corners attached directly to the base unit, the opposite side is held in position
with two adjustable device restraints. To ensure consistent physical placement of the
multiple boards, the same two holes are used every time. By using the same holes to
attach the different boards, the location of interest should not move. This allows for
consistency of the physical test area and probe placement. For every test, the probe needs
a reference location in the bottom left hand corner. This reference allows for the same test
area to be used for all the scans, despite the spatial resolution. Finally, the whole suite of
tests can be measured. More details on the suite of tests are described in the following
sections.
Device Under Test (DUT)
The device of interest is a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA chip housed on a Papilio Pro
circuit board. This silicon-based device is a COTS product so it is cost-effective, easy to
use, and offers the user the flexibility of reprogramming the device to induce a specific
change. In this research, change is induced by alternating the programmed frequency
from 305 MHz, using three inverters, to a frequency of 225 MHz, using 5 inverters.
Figures 6 and 7 depict the Papilio board with Spartan-6 FPGA. Both the packaged and Xray image are portrayed.
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Figure 6 Papilio Pro Circuit Board with Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA (Gadget Factory, 2015)

Figure 7 Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA X-Ray image taken by Steve Tetlak (AFRL/RYDD,
2015)
Twelve boards were purchased to complete the various test routines described in
the following sections, one of which was damaged on arrival from the manufacturer and
was not be used for testing. The micro-USB adapter was damaged and the part could not
be turned on or programmed. This part was used as a practice part for the etching process.
Table 1 describes the allocation of devices for each test. The number of devices was
selected based on the real-world application and constraints (time, money, and resources)
of this project in the laboratory environment. The sample size is not large enough to be
statistically significant, but this is what resources were allocated for this project. To
achieve statistically significant data (α = 0.05) and assuming an effect size of large with a
power of 0.80, the minimal sample size would be 26 devices as shown in Table 2 from
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Cohen’s “A Power Primer” (Cohen, 1992). With the current sample size of 11, for the
process variation test, the experiment will only have a power of approximately 0.43
rather than the recommend 0.80 as noted at the top of Table 2.
Table 1 DUT Allocation
Device ID DOE Process Variation Test Sensitivity Test Etched Test
X
Device 1
X
Device 2
X
Device 3
X
X
Device 4
X
Device 5
X
Device 6
X
X
Device 7
X
Device 8
X
Device 9
X
X
Device 10
X
Device 11
Device 12
Damaged

Table 2 Minimal sample size based on effect size, power, test, and α. (Cohen, 1992)
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Test Routines
A brief description of the test routines was mentioned in the previous section as it
applies to the particular device(s) and sample size. Below is a block diagram that
illustrates the testing process for this research. Each of the blocks is described in more
detail below.

Develop
DOE

Randomly
Test

Optimize
Factors

Measure
Variations

Analyze
Sensitivity

Scan
Etched Part

Compare
All Scans
Figure 8 Test Routine Block Diagram
Develop DOE
The initial step in this multi-step process is to develop a DOE including all the
independent and dependent factors. For this set of experiments there are five independent
factors, each with two levels, and there are two dependent factors. The five independent
factors are probe type, Z-height, spatial resolution, frequency range, and resolution
bandwidth (RBW). There are two probe types, E and H-field probes. Past experience has
indicated that a scan using the E-field probe portrays more of the functionality of the
device, as opposed to a scan with an H-field probe which depicts more of the operational
aspects of the circuit. The Z-height varied between 1 mm and 5 mm above the device
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depending on the test. Spatial resolution refers to the X, Y-grid spacing over the device;
the smaller the resolution, the more points that were measured over the device area. The
spatial resolution varied between 0.2 mm and 1 mm over the device depending on the
test. The frequency range describes the total frequency spectrum range with the center
point of 300 MHz. The two levels for the frequency range are 100 MHz and 500 MHz
depending on the test. The incremental spacing used in frequency range refers to the
RBW. The RBW is typically automatically set to 10 kHz, but for this set of tests it will
vary from 100 Hz to 10,000 Hz (10 kHz). The independent factors and their levels are
listed in Table 3.
Table 3 Independent Factors and Levels
Independent Factor Low Level High Level
E-field
H-field
Probe
1 mm
5 mm
Z-Height
0.2 mm
1 mm
Spatial Resolution
100 MHz 500 MHz
Frequency Range
100 Hz 10,000 Hz
RBW
As mentioned previously, there are two dependent factors--peak programmed
frequency and time of scan. Frequency magnitude measured in dBm0 is the key
component of the peak programmed frequency and is the main response for the DOE.
Several other components of the peak programmed frequency are subjectively analyzed.
These components include the peak programmed frequency, the peak’s X, Y, Z spatial
locations, and the width of that peak. The time of scan is measured in minutes from the
time data collection starts at point 1 until it collects all the data at all points selected
based on the test setup. The dependent factors are listed in Table 4.
Table 4 Dependent Factors
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Dependent Factors
Peak Programmed Frequency
Time of Scan

Component
Magnitude
Minutes

The DOE consists of five factors (the five independent factors) at two levels each.
A full, half, and quarter factorials are all viable options, but based on the constraints
noted above and due to the objective of identifying those factors with large effects, a half
fractional factorial (25-1) design with center points is sufficient for this DOE. Screening
experiments such as this are typically performed in the early stages of a project to
determine significant factors. The center points are included as a checking mechanism
throughout the DOE and eliminate the assumption of linearity.
Randomly Test
A total of twenty tests were established in the DOE, sixteen from the half
fractional factorial design plus four center points. The run order was randomized to
eliminate potential bias or day-to-day variations. Randomizing the experiments allows for
more reliable and valid data. Table 5 shows the randomized test order used for this
research. The four center points are scattered throughout the test sequence of the DOE to
check for consistency. For the DOE, the FPGA is programmed as a ring oscillator at a
frequency of 305 MHz, using 3 inverters to act as a point source. Two nuisance factors
were defined in this research – room temperature and humidity. These factors may have
an effect on the response, but are not controlled. Therefore, the ambient values were
monitored throughout the various tests with a temperature/humidity data logger. Their
effects are outside the scope of this research effort, and were noted as nuisance factors.
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Table 5 DOE Test Order and Sequence
RunOrder

StdOrder

Probe

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

16
19
4
20
3
13
2
5
8
11
1
7
18
14
10
17
6
15
9
12

H
E
H
H
E
E
H
E
H
E
E
E
H
H
H
E
H
E
E
H

Z-Height
(mm)
5
3
5
3
5
1
1
1
5
5
1
5
3
1
1
3
1
5
1
5

Spatial Resolution Frequency
(mm)
Range (MHz)
1
1000
0.6
750
0.2
500
0.6
750
0.2
500
1
1000
0.2
500
1
500
1
500
0.2
1000
0.2
500
1
500
0.6
750
1
1000
0.2
1000
0.6
750
1
500
1
1000
0.2
1000
0.2
1000

RBW
(Hz)
10000
5000.5
10000
5000.5
1
10000
1
1
1
10000
10000
10000
5000.5
1
10000
5000.5
10000
1
1
1

*Center points are highlighted gray.
Optimize Factors
After the data are collected for the DOE designed above, all factors and responses
are analyzed (described in Chapter IV). From the gathered data, significant factors are
determined. Then the factors can be optimized to produce the desired responses based on
this DOE. Ideally, the optimized factors will produce a high magnitude peak programmed
frequency in a short scan time. Means and standard deviations of the peak programmed
frequency are calculated from the various scans.
Measure Variations
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With the optimization of the factors, the process variations between the 11 boards
can be scanned and compared. Once again the FPGA is programmed as a ring oscillator
at a frequency of 305 MHz. Subtle changes in the signature can be attributed to basic
fabrication practices that create a unique fingerprint for each device. Extreme variations
can be linked to a process defect, a counterfeit device, or an indication of tampering.
Overall, this can be used as a designator that the part should not be used in the end
system. The means and standard deviations of the different boards are calculated to
account for the normal process variation. This is an important feature that is fed forward
in the next test routine.
Analyze Sensitivity
After the average process variation was calculated from the tests described above
the FPGA was reprogrammed (still as a ring oscillator), by using a different number of
inverters (5 instead of 3) to adjust the frequency from 305 MHz to 225 MHz. This value
was selected in order to be outside the range of the natural manufacturing variance.
Scan Etched Part
The final part tested was a board that had part of the packaging etched away in
order to expose the die and bond wires. Another scan with the optimized factors and the
original programming as a ring oscillator at 305 MHz is completed. The purpose of this
scan is to determine if the package provides any shielding that may lower the magnitudes
or narrow the widths of any frequencies.
X-ray images were taken using an Xradia (now Zeiss) Micro XCT200. Figures 9
and 10 display the X-ray 2-D and 3-D images of the FPGA. The 2-D image had a 30
second exposure with 150 kV source and a 10 W beam energy. The 3-D image had the
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same parameters, but it was averaged three times from -91 to 91 degrees. The 3-D scan
took approximately 6 hours. Silver paint had to be added to the top of the package to act
as an absorbing coat in order to clearly see the epoxy package surface. The epoxy
package could not be seen in the original scan due to all the peripheral circuitry. Also,
cable connectors absorbed too much of the low energy X-rays, that usually would have
been absorbed by the mold compound. Figure 11 shows the relative measurement from
the top of the wire bond to the backside of the package to be approximately 150 um. This
is the distance that must be etched through to expose the bond wires.

Figure 9 Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA top view X-Ray image taken by Steve Tetlak
(AFRL/RYDD, 2015).
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Figure 10 Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA 3-D cross section X-Ray image taken by Steve Tetlak
(AFRL/RYDD, 2015).

Figure 11 Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA 3-D cross section measurement X-Ray image taken by
Steve Tetlak (AFRL/RYDD, 2015)
The information from Figure 11 allows the process engineer to determine the
parameters for the etching process. Board 12 (the damaged board) was originally used as
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a practice board by the process engineer. This board was etched for 45 seconds in a nitric
and sulfuric bath using a Nisene JetEtch II. This duration damaged the board beyond use.
The second board, Board 10, was etched in the same nitric and sulfuric bath for only 10
seconds using a Nisene JetEtch II. The parameters of the etch were not optimized due to
the limited number of samples available to refine the process. The center of the package
was etched out to expose the die and the bond wires. Figure 12 displays the final outcome
of the etching.

Figure 12 Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA etched for 10 seconds (Etching performed by Jim
Alverson, AFRL/RYDD, 2015).
Compare All Scans
After each set of tests, the scans were analyzed and compared to similar scans
with matching conditions. The EM-ISight V4.4 software has a delta plot application that
compares two scans taken at separate times, with the same test parameters (frequency
range, spatial resolution, etc.) and creates an EM signature plot that displays the
difference between the two scans. This feature is useful for determining variations in
magnitude, location displacements, and frequency shifts throughout the spectrum. The
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delta plots are used to analyze the differences in the programming for the sensitivity
analysis and the difference in the shielding effects in the etched board test.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
This chapter discusses the application of the methodology and the results of the
various tests outlined in Chapter III. Analysis of the responses from the DOE is
completed to determine significant factors and their interactions. These factors are then
optimized based on the desirability of each response. This optimization was used for the
remainder of the tests including the process variation, sensitivity, and etched tests.
Frequency and magnitude plots are illustrated for a visual representation of the responses
on the FPGA. Frequency spectrums are used as well to depict the difference between
tests.
DOE Test Results
Twenty tests were conducted over three days for the DOE. Two nuisance factors,
temperature and humidity, were measured throughout this time period. These factors are
depicted in Figure 13. The temperature varied between 70 and 80oF while the relative
humidity fluctuated between 40 and 50%. This small change in factors did not appear to
have a significant effect on the DOE test responses. These responses are highlighted
yellow in Table 6. The two responses measured for the DOE were the magnitude (dBm0)
of the peak programmed frequency and the total time (minutes) taken to scan the entire
FPGA. The magnitude plots are in dBm0. The magnitude units started as raw data (dBm)
collected from the spectrum analyzer and then the EM-ISight software extracted all the
losses and gains throughout the system as depicted in Figure 3 from Chapter II. This
includes the probe coupling loss, LNA gain, BDU loss, cable losses (3 calbes total), and a
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custom compensation factor for each manufacturer calibrated frequency. All of these
were measured in dBm. Equation 1 calculates the the total dBm0 value for every
measured point. For frequencies not included in the manufacturer’s table, the software
takes a linear interpolation between the two closes frequencies for the equation. A table
of the calibrated frequencies for each probe can be found in Appendix B.

Figure 13 Plot of nuisance factors over DOE test period.
dBm0 = dBm - [Probe Coupling Loss (Vp_dBm)] - [LNA Gain] - [BDU Loss] - [Cable
Losses (C1 to C3)] - [Custom Compensation Factors (K2 + K3)]
Equation 1 Calibrated Magnitude Value.
In addition to the two responses recorded in Table 6, several supplementary
responses were documented. Table 7 encompasses these responses. It includes the
number of peaks, the peak programmed frequency (MHz), that frequency’s magnitude
(dBm0), location (X, Y, Z), and the frequency width (MHz) for the programmed peak.
The mean and standard deviation of each of these responses was calculated and is
displayed in the last two rows of the table.
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Table 6 DOE Responses
Run Time Time
Order Start End

Probe

806
823
954
1140
1207
1346
1402
1545
1558
1618
812
956
1006
1037
1051
1446
1513
1523
1537
948

H
E
H
H
E
E
H
E
H
E
E
E
H
H
H
E
H
E
E
H

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

816
845
1128
1203
1341
1356
1538
1551
1603
2006
946
1011
1028
1047
1440
1508
1518
1535
1926
1336

Z-Height Spatial Res Frequency
(mm)
(mm)
Range
(MHz)
5
1
500
3
0.6
300
5
0.2
100
3
0.6
300
5
0.2
100
1
1
500
1
0.2
100
1
1
100
5
1
100
5
0.2
500
1
0.2
100
5
1
100
3
0.6
300
1
1
500
1
0.2
500
3
0.6
300
1
1
100
5
1
500
1
0.2
500
5
0.2
500

*Center points are highlighted gray.
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RBW FreqMag
(Hz)
(dBm0)
10000
5050
10000
5050
100
10000
100
100
100
10000
10000
10000
5050
100
10000
5050
10000
100
100
100

-26.49
-24.65
-26.51
-22.23
-28.49
-18.65
-16.21
-18.87
-27.01
-27.76
-18.49
-24.84
-22.72
-16.59
-16.11
-22.98
-16.79
-25.12
-17.72
-26.37

Scan
Time
(min)
10
22
94
23
94
10
96
6
5
228
94
15
22
10
229
22
5
12
229
228

Table 7 Supplementary DOE Responses
Run
Order
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Test Conditions

H, 5, 1, 500, 10000
E, 3, 0.6, 300, 5050
H, 5, 0.2, 100, 10000
H, 3, 0.6, 300, 5050
E, 5, 0.2, 100, 100
E, 1, 1, 500, 10000
H, 1, 0.2, 100, 100
E, 1, 1, 100, 100
H, 5, 1, 100, 100
E, 5, 0.2, 500, 10000
E, 1, 0.2, 100, 10000
E, 5, 1, 100, 10000
H, 3, 0.6, 300, 5050
H, 1, 1, 500, 100
H, 1, 0.2, 500, 10000
E, 3, 0.6, 300, 5050
H, 1, 1, 100, 10000
E, 5, 1, 500, 100
E, 1, 0.2, 500, 100
H, 5, 0.2, 500, 100
Mean
Standard Deviation

# Peaks
18
15
6
12
6
20
7
7
7
20
6
6
13
18
18
14
7
18
18
18
12.7
5.58

Prog Peak Prog Freq Mag
Prog Freq Loc Prog Freq Width
Freq (MHz)
(dBm0)
(X, Y, Z)
(MHz)
306.25
-26.49
(13.99, 20, 5)
13.75
307.5
-24.65
(13.79, 19.8, 3)
9.375
307.375
-26.51
(14.21, 19.8, 5)
10.375
306
-22.23
(13.79, 19.8, 3)
12.375
303.25
-28.49
(14.78, 6.4, 5)
10.75
305.625
-18.65
(13.99, 20, 1)
10.625
305.875
-16.21
(13.79, 20, 1)
13.25
305.625
-18.87
(12.99, 19.99, 1)
9.75
307
-27.01
(14, 20, 5)
10.125
303.125
-27.76
(19.02, 4.99, 5)
11.25
306.375
-18.49
(13.39, 20, 1)
12.75
303.375
-24.84
(16, 19.99, 5)
12.25
306.375
-22.72
(13.81, 19.19, 3.01)
12.75
305.625
-16.59
(13.99, 20, 1)
13.75
305.625
-16.11
(13.58, 20, 1)
13.75
303.375
-22.98
(13.19, 19.8, 3)
12
306.75
-16.79
(13.99, 20, 1)
13.125
303.125
-25.12
(14.99, 20, 5)
11.25
305.625
-17.72
(13.19, 20, 1)
10.625
306.25
-26.37
(13.79, 20, 5)
10.625
305.50625
-22.23
(14.21, 18.5, 3)
11.725
1.45
4.36
(1.32, 4.39, 1.84)
1.42

*Center points are highlighted gray.
Figure 14 shows an enlarged view of the frequency spectrum plots to show more
detail. For viewing purposes, the frequency spectrums for the DOE tests are split into two
figures, Figures 15 and 16. The frequency spans from 50 to 550 MHz with a center
frequency of 300 MHz for the X-axis and -60 to 7 dBm0 for the Y-axis. There are several
grayed out areas. These areas indicate a non-constant noise floor. For the E-field probe
everything below 150 MHz is considered noise and for the H-field probe everything
below 100 MHz is considered noise. Eliminating these areas allows for a more consistent
noise floor and comparison of the peak magnitudes.
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Figure 15 DOE Frequency Spectrum Tests 1-10
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Figure 16 DOE Frequency Spectrum Tests 11-20
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Figure 17 is an enlarged view of the frequency and magnitude plots, in order to
show more detail. The plots on the left show the number of points used for the scan and
in this case, the dimensions of the DUT as well since the spatial resolution was 1 mm.
The plots on the right depict the APREL signatures overlaid on the X-ray image of the
FPGA. In all the plots the blue dot or circle indicates the location with the highest
magnitude.
Figures 18 and 19 represent the overall frequency and magnitude plots of the
peak programmed frequency. The E-field tests show majority of the part radiating at the
peak programmed frequency, whereas the H-field tests act as a point source that
decreases in magnitude away from the point on the upper right edge of the device. The
shape of the frequency plots vary between the E and H-field tests. The H-field tests have
a funnel shaped design for the programmed frequency whereas the programmed
frequency for E-field tests consume between 75-100 percent of the device. These unique
map signatures can be a potential diagnostic tool for counterfeit electronic parts analysis.
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Figure 17 Enlarged Frequency and Magnitude Plots
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Figure 18 DOE Frequency and Magnitude Plots Tests 1-10
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Figure 19 DOE Frequency and Magnitude Plots Tests 11-20
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An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed for each response using JMP
V10. The significant factors and interactions are shown in Figure 20 for the frequency
magnitude response and Figure 21 for the scan time response. The only significant factor
to effect frequency magnitude was the Z-height (outlined in red). This implies that a
stronger signal is received through the probe when the probe is closer to the device. The
signal strength decreases as the probe moves further away.

Figure 20 Frequency Magnitude Response Significant Factor (JMP Output)
The scan time response also had one significant factor, but had another almost
signifigant factor and interaction that is worth noting (outlined in blue). The spatial
resolution (outlined in red) is the significant factor for the response time. Therefore, the
more points measured, the longer the scan time. The frequency range is outside the 0.05
alpha value, but is the next significant factor after spatial resolution. The interaction of
these two factors, spatial resolution and frequency range, also produce an almost
significant response.
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Figure 21 Scan Time Response Significant Factor (JMP Output)
Because a factor and an interaction were close to being significant, another
ANOVA was run with only three factors: Z-height, spatial resolution, and frequency
range. There was no change in the magnitude response. The Z-height remained the only
significant factor. However, running the ANOVA with three factors produced a different
result for the scan time response. Figure 22 shows that there are two significant factors
(spatial resolution and frequency range) and one significant interaction (spatial resolution
* frequency range).This verifies that the frequency range and the interaction between the
spatial resolution and frequency range are significant when the non-significant factors are
taken out of the equation.
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Figure 22 Scan Time Response Significant Factors and Interactions with Only Three
Factors (JMP Output)
After reviewing the significant factors, all the factors were optimized based on the
response desirability. The desired response is measured on a scale from 0 (not desired) to
1 (desired). A higher frequency magnitude and a lower scan time are the desired
outcomes for every scan. The optimization of the factors based on those desired outcomes
is highlighted in red in Figure 23. These optimized settings are used for the remainder of
the tests in this research. Those factor levels are the H-field probe, 1 mm Z-height, 1 mm
spatial resolution, 500 MHz frequency range, and 100 Hz RBW.

Figure 23 Factor optimization based on desirability
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Process Variations Test Results
To determine the process variations, over the various boards, all the boards were
tested using the optimized factor settings selected above. The results along with the
means, differences, and standard deviations of these tests are located in Table 8. Board 1
and 12 did not work properly as demonstrated by the orange rows. Board 1 arrived in
functional condition from the vendor and was programmed as a ring oscillator at a
frequency of 305 MHz using three inverters. When the part was powered up to verify
accurate programming, the programmed peak was at approximately 320 MHz. The signal
shifted from 320 to 380 MHz over the course of a few minutes while the board warmed
up. Once the board was powered down and turned back on, the programmed signal was
gone altogether. The board was still scanned to show what a bad device looks like. Board
12 was delivered with a broken micro-USB connector. The board was never programmed
and was used as a trial chip for the etching process, described in Chapter III.
Table 8 Process Variations Results Table
Board

Frequency
(MHz)

Location
Magnitude
(X, Y, Z)
(dBm0)
Bad Device
1
321.25
(13.99, 20, 1)
-13.42
2
306.25
(13.99, 19.99, 1)
-16.74
3
308.125
(13.99, 20, 1)
-15.91
4
311.25
(14, 20, 1)
-17.71
5
306.25
(13.99, 19.99, 1)
-17.15
6
310
(14.01, 18.98, 1.01)
-14.5
7
316.25
(13.99, 20, 1)
-14.62
8
312.5
(13.99, 20, 1)
-15.23
9
306.875
(12.99, 20, 1)
-16.77
10
301.875
(13.99, 19.99, 1)
-16.64
11
Damaged
12
Mean
310.0625 (13.89, 19.89, 1)
-15.869
Difference
19.375
(1.02, 1.02, 0.01)
4.29
Standard Deviation
5.59
(0.32, 0.32, 0.00)
1.38
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Width
(MHz)
15
15
13.75
15
11.25
14.375
15
14.375
14.375
13.125
14.125
3.75
1.19

Table 8 shows the mean peak programmed frequency to be approximately 310
MHz, with a standard deviation of 5.59 MHz. Figure 24 depicts each board’s peak
programmed frequency magnitude with respect to the standard deviation. The blue box
represents one standard deviation around the mean for both magnitude and frequency,
yellow is two standard deviations and red is 3 standard deviations. Only one board
(Board 2) was outside two standard deviations, three boards are within two standard
deviations, and the rest are within one standard deviation.

Figure 24 Programmed Peak Frequency and Magnitude by Board
Figures 25 and 26 display the consistency of peaks throughout the frequency
spectrum with the exception of Board 1. As in the DOE, the frequency range from 50 to
100 MHz is grayed out to account for the rise in the noise floor. The area of interest, in
the frequency spectrum, is in the black box highlighted yellow.
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Figure 25 Programmed Peak Frequency and Magnitude by Board
Figure 27 illustrates the uniformity of the frequency and magnitude plots, with
respect to location. The peak programmed frequency is located on the top right edge of
the FPGA. That programmed frequency is also the dominant frequency for the upper
right quadrant.
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Figure 26 Process Variations Frequency Spectrum by Board
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Figure 27 Process Variations Frequency and Magnitude Plots by Board
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Once again, the temperature and humidity were measured throughout the tests to
ensure consistent ambient settings. The temperature varied between 70 and 80oF, while
the relative humidity fluctuated between 40 and 50%. These numbers are consistent with
the DOE nuisance factors measured. This small change in factors does not appear to have
a significant effect on the process variations.

Figure 28 Process Variations Nuisance Factors
Sensitivity Analysis Test Results
The purpose of the sensitivity analysis is to reproduce a similar signal to the 305
MHz, but slightly shifted along the frequency spectrum and outside the limit of the
process variations. By using five inverters instead of three the frequency shifted from 305
MHz to 225 MHz. This signal is repeated at 450 MHz with a lower magnitude as a
harmonic. Board 7 was utilized in this test to validate the feasibility of detecting another
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programmed signal. Figure 29 depicts the 305 MHz, 225 MHz, and the delta frequency
spectrums. The 305 MHz and 225 MHz are measured in dBm0 with a range from -60 to 7
dBm0. The delta plot must be viewed in dB. The X-axis on the delta plot is from -34 to
40 dB. The delta plot shows a large peak in the middle of the spectrum (around 310
MHz) and then two small negative peaks at 225 MHz and 450 MHz. This accounts for
the non-existent peaks in the 305 MHz measurement.

Figure 29 Sensitivity Analysis Frequency Spectrums
The frequency and magnitude plots for the sensitivity analysis are shown in
Figure 30. The frequency plots have a slight color differentiation from bright green to
light green demonstrating a lower dominate frequency in the upper right quadrant of the
part, between the 305 MHz programmed frequency and the 225 MHz frequency. The
location however, is nearly identical for the peak programmed frequencies in each test.
Not only are the magnitude values for 225 MHz and 450 MHz smaller, but the widths are
narrower when compared to the original 305 MHz signal.
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Board 7
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Figure 30 Sensitivity Analysis Frequency and Magnitude Plots by Test
Table 9 Sensitivity Analysis Table
Board 7 Test
Frequency
Location
Magnitude
(MHz)
(X, Y, Z)
(dBm0 or dB)
310
(14.01, 18.98, 1.01)
-14.5
305 MHz
226.25
(13.99, 20, 1)
-18.03
225 MHz
453.125
(12.99, 20, 1)
-29.63
450 MHz
310
(14.01, 18.98, 1.01)
41.63
305 MHz Delta (Positive )
(13, 20, 1)
-33.73
225 MHz Delta (Negative) 226.25
(13, 20, 1)
-27.61
450 MHz Delta (Negative) 453.125

Width
(MHz)
14.375
9.375
13.125
13.125
6.25
14.375

Etched Test Results
The final set of tests consisted of etching one board in a nitric and sulfuric bath
for 10 seconds, using a Nisene JetEtch II. The parameters of the etch were not optimized,
due to the limited number of samples to refine the process. The center of the package was
etched out to expose the die and the bond wires. The purpose of this test was to examine
if the package provided any signal shielding. Overall, the magnitude had a minimal
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change between the package and etched part. There appears to be slightly larger area on
the device that has higher magnitude.

Figure 31 Etched Frequency and Magnitude Plots by Test
Board 10
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Figure 32 Etched Frequency Spectrums
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Mag
(dBm0)

Layered
Mag
(dBm0)

The main difference between the packaged and etched device is noticed in the
width of the peak. The etched board has a narrower peak than the packaged board. This
could infer that when the emission hits the package it slightly scatters the signal and
creates a wider peak. Or another theory is that the dielectric properties of the package
material is causing some resonances to shift slightly, and therefore increases the peak’s
bandwidth.
Table 10 Etched Analysis Table
Board 10 Test Frequency
Location
Magnitude
(MHz)
(X, Y, Z)
(dBm0 or dB)
306.875
(12.99, 20, 1)
-16.77
Packaged
307.5
(13.99, 19.99, 1)
-16.43
Etched
303.75 (12.01, 18.98, 1.01)
20.2
Delta (Positive)
310
(12, 11, 1)
-19.53
Delta (Negative)

Width
(MHz)
14.375
12.5
5.625
6.875

Investigative Questions Answered
Chapter I discussed four investigative questions to be answered with this research.
Each question is answered below based on the test results discussed in this chapter.
-

Can counterfeit electronic parts be detected using the part’s unintentional
electromagnetic signature?

A part’s unintentional electromagnetic signature is an indicator of a part’s health,
as shown in the process variation tests executed in this research. Chapter V will describe
several topics of study to further this research, to provide a well-rounded answer to this
question.
-

How effective is the APREL EM-ISight at detecting counterfeit electronic
parts?
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The answer to this question is similar to the answer to the previous question. The
APREL EM-ISight successfully detected and characterized a bad part during the process
variation tests. The lack of peaks, at any frequency in the spectrum, is a key indicator in
the identification of the defective part. This was shown in Figures 26 and 27. The system
also successfully detected the programmed frequency change in the sensitivity analysis.
The detection of both of the defective part in the process variation test and the
programmed frequency change in the sensitivity analysis tests, provide a good foundation
in the effectiveness of the APREL EM-ISight at detecting counterfeit electronic parts. In
order to answer this question in its entirety more research and tests need to be conducted.
Some of these suggestions are expanded upon in Chapter V.
-

What is the optimal test setup to detect parts?

The DOE identified significant factors and interactions. The desirability of the
two response factors were considered equally important. For this system a higher
frequency magnitude and lower scan time are the desired effects of a scan. Optimizing
each factor with those desired effects produced the following setting for each of the five
factors: H-field probe, Z-height of 1 mm, spatial resolution of 1 mm, frequency range of
500 MHz, and a RBW of 100 Hz. These were the optimal settings for this particular
device and its specific programming. This may not be the case for every device. This
research has evaluated the tradeoff between resolutions, both spatially and spectrally, and
time and concluded that the time saved is worth the minimal degradation in resolution.
-

How repeatable are the test results?

More testing with additional parts would need to be conducted in order to answer
this question with any statistical significance. The tests performed in this research infer
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that scans with similar setups would provide comparable results (same peaks, relative
magnitudes at those peaks, etc.), but with the limited number of samples and tests, this
question cannot be answered completely. See Chapter V for recommendations on future
research.
Summary
Chapter IV provided a synopsis of the results of the DOE, process variations,
sensitivity analysis, and etched part tests performed in this research. This research did not
exhaust all the avenues required to ensure the identification of counterfeit parts and the
repeatability of test results.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this research was to identify the feasibility of using APREL’s EMISight to detect a device’s inherent electromagnetic signature and use that signature to
identify if a part is counterfeit or authentic. The initial steps for this research were to
conduct a DOE to determine significant factors and then optimize all the factors to obtain
the desired response. Several devices were measured at these optimized settings to
acquire the variation in the parts, due to the manufacturer’s process. A sensitivity analysis
was conducted to conclude that a programmed frequency change in the same part could
be detected with this measurement. Finally, an etched part was measured to show that the
packaging material provided minimal shielding, but did show a change in the peak width.
Chapter V provides conclusions based on the results and analysis from Chapter IV and
builds on those results, to recommend future areas of research and applications.
Significance of Research
Current counterfeit detection techniques are limited in their capability to identify
counterfeit electronic parts due to time, cost, and effectiveness. 3-D EM mapping with
the APREL EM-ISight opens an opportunity for a non-destructive and relatively quick,
cheap, and effective detection technique to recognize counterfeit electronic parts. This
technique can also be utilized for other research aspects such as failure analysis, health
status of a part, circuit board design layout, and parts shielding.
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Recommendations for Action
Working on this research brought about two recommendations for action. The
first is a camera/probe integration for image processing. A combined camera probe with
image processing would increase the accuracy for pinpointing components or a specific
bond wire that is emitting the signal under investigation. The current method uses an
uploaded image that can be cropped and rotated to mimic the DUT. The user is then
responsible for lining up the probe and that image as accurately as possible. This leaves
room for human error and is not as exact as a camera integrated into the probe. The
system would then perform image processing to line up the DUT for a more exact
representation.
A second recommendation is the development of a small scale probe array or
array of arrays that can be placed over the entire DUT for simultaneous measurement of
the EME. This simultaneous measurement would be beneficial, especially for digital
circuits, by taking a single snapshot instead of taking a different measurement in time, as
the probe physically moves around the DUT. This was not an issue for this research, due
to the simplicity of the device selected, but it will be vital for more complex devices. In
addition to simultaneously taking a measurement, it would be valuable to be able to select
a specific probe or subset of probes in the array for isolating a particular area.
Recommendations for Future Research
The initial recommendation for future research was originally addressed in
Chapter III. The sample size is not large enough to be statistically significant. Future
research should include more devices, in order to be statistically significant. In addition
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to the number of devices tested, other elements can be introduced such as multiple
vendors, different boards with the same device, or different versions of the same device.
These different elements would add a deeper understanding of the types of variations in
the EM signature that are to be expected.
Several factors can be added to the DOE to determine their impact. The main
system factor that was not investigated in this research was the rotational angle of the
probe. The software allows for a user to input any angle and the BDU/probe component
will rotate to that angle and complete the measurement at the specified angle. This would
most likely produce a different EM signature. In this research the ambient temperature
and humidity were measured as a nuisance factor. Placing the DUT under multiple
temperature settings, to see if it has any impact on the EM signature, would be another
recommended test to better characterize a device.
Since recycled parts are one of the main contributors to counterfeit electronic
parts, an ALT would help characterize a parts aging profile. This could also identify a
part’s remainder of usable life. An aging profile would be a key element in the detection
of reused parts.
Two other recommendations include full circuit board scans and the
characterization of digital boards. The addition of harmful devices, malicious code, and
viruses are becoming more prevalent in counterfeit electronic parts. The identification of
these features, before the part is integrated into the final platform, is crucial to retain the
integrity and reliability of the system.
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Conclusions of Research
This research established the viability of using APREL’s EM-ISight to detect a
device’s inherent electromagnetic signature. A FPGA was utilized for its availability,
flexibility, and ease of use. Although the classification of whether the part was a
counterfeit part or not could not be determined, the system could be used as health
diagnosis or failure analysis tool. Flagging a part due to its health can prompt further
investigation of the integrity of the part. During the process variation tests it was obvious
that Board 1 was not working properly when compared with the other 10 boards. The
lack of activity and peak frequencies was a strong indicator that Board 1 was not
functioning as intended.
Another finding from this research is the characterization of the tradeoff between
resolution and scan time. Both spatial and spectral resolutions were assessed. The
nominal improvement in the resolution did not outweigh the time saved during the scan.
A 10-minute scan characterized the part just as effectively as a 4-hour scan.
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Appendix A
Table 11 Assessment of counterfeit detection methods. (Guin, DiMase, & Tehranipoor,
2014)
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Figure 33 Taxonomy of counterfeit component types. (Guin, DiMase, & Tehranipoor,
2014)

Figure 34 Taxonomy of counterfeit detection methods. (Guin, DiMase, & Tehranipoor,
2014)
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Figure 35 Taxonomy of defects and anomalies present in counterfeit electronic
components. (Guin, DiMase, & Tehranipoor, 2014)
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Appendix B
Setup Data
Probe
Name: APRL_701-00113_H-Probe_6GHz_Broad6GhzLNA w/Shield
Serial Number: 701-00113
Probe Type: H_xy
Frequency Range: 10 KHz to 6 GHz
Model: ALS-EMIS-P-H-M2.2
Compensation Value: 0
Calibration Date: 3/24/3015
Calibration Standard: IEC 61967-6 2002
Ch_dB_APRL: 27.5041099464328
Ch_dB_IEC: 0

Probe Factor Table
Freq
(MHz)
0.0100
0.1000
100.0000
300.0000
835.0000
900.0000
1600.0000
1800.0000
1900.0000
2450.0000
3500.0000
5200.0000
5800.0000
6000.0000

Hx_dB
Target (dB
A/m)
-18.20
-18.20
-18.20
-18.20
-18.20
-18.20
-18.20
-18.20
-18.20
-18.20
-18.20
-18.20
-18.20
-18.20

Vp_m
(dBm)

Vp_r
(dBV)

Cf_dB (dB
S/m)

K1_dB

K2_dB

K3_dB

-123.70
-111.50
-56.40
-47.90
-39.20
-37.70
-37.20
-37.10
-36.30
-33.70
-36.80
-37.00
-34.50
-39.70

-136.71
-124.51
-69.41
-60.91
-52.21
-50.71
-50.21
-50.11
-49.31
-46.71
-49.81
-50.01
-47.51
-52.71

121.11
108.91
53.81
45.31
36.61
35.11
34.61
34.51
33.71
31.11
34.21
34.41
31.91
37.11

-2.60
-2.60
-2.60
-2.60
-2.60
-2.60
-2.60
-2.60
-2.60
-2.60
-2.60
-2.60
-2.60
-2.60

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Probe
Name: APRL_710-00106_E-Probe_6GHz_Broad6GhzLNA
Serial Number: 710-00106
Probe Type: H_xy
Frequency Range: 10 KHz to 6 GHz
Model: ALS-EMIS-P-E-M2.2
Compensation Value: 0
Calibration Date: N/A
Calibration Standard: IEC 61967-6 2002
Ch_dB_APRL: 27.5041099464328
Ch_dB_IEC: 0
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Probe Factor Table
Freq (MHz)
0.0100
0.1000
100.0000
300.0000
835.0000
900.0000
1600.0000
1800.0000
1900.0000
2450.0000
3500.0000
5200.0000
5800.0000

Hx_dB
Target
(dB A/m)
29.34
29.34
29.34
29.34
29.34
29.34
29.34
29.34
29.34
29.34
29.34
29.34
29.34

Vp_m
(dBm)

Vp_r
(dBV)

Cf_dB
(dB S/m)

K1_dB

K2_dB

K3_dB

-143.50
-123.50
-68.50
-54.50
-47.10
-45.70
-44.10
-44.10
-44.20
-41.80
-43.70
-48.60
-46.10

-156.51
-136.51
-81.51
-67.51
-60.11
-58.71
-57.11
-57.11
-57.21
-54.81
-56.71
-61.61
-59.11

140.91
120.91
65.91
51.91
44.51
43.11
41.51
41.51
41.61
39.21
41.11
46.01
43.51

44.94
44.94
44.94
44.94
44.94
44.94
44.94
44.94
44.94
44.94
44.94
44.94
44.94

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Signal Path Table
Freq (MHz)

PreAmp (dB)

0.0100
0.1000
100.0000
300.0000
835.0000
900.0000
1600.0000
1800.0000
1900.0000
2450.0000
3500.0000
5200.0000
5800.0000
6000.0000

15.90
17.60
32.00
31.90
32.10
32.10
32.60
32.50
32.50
32.80
32.40
32.30
31.80
32.00

BDU loss
(dB)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

C1 loss (dB)

C2 loss (dB)

C3 loss (dB)

-0.10
-0.10
-0.40
-0.60
-0.90
-1.00
-1.30
-1.30
-1.40
-1.60
-1.90
-2.30
-2.40
-2.50

-0.10
-0.10
-0.30
-0.50
-0.90
-1.00
-1.30
-1.30
-1.40
-1.50
-1.80
-2.20
-2.40
-2.40

-0.20
-0.20
-0.40
-0.70
-1.20
-1.30
-1.70
-1.80
-1.80
-2.10
-2.50
-3.10
-3.30
-3.30

Pre-Amp
Name: BroadBand_6GHz
Input Impedance: 50 ohm
Frequency Span: 0.010 to 6 GHz
Linearity: +/- 1.5 dB
Dynamic Range: 13 dBm
Calibration Date: 3/24/3015
Micro-Stripline
Name: APREL_MSL_6GHz
Serial No: 690-00109
Vs (dB V): -13.01 db V
h (mm): 0.6 mm
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w (mm): 1 mm
Impedance (dB): 50 ohm
Calibration Date: 3/24/3015
BDU
Name: default_LineLoss 4.1
Description: Sum of BDU_L C1_L C2_L C3_L
Serial No: Do not modify this record
Model: 0001
Calibration Date: N/A
Cable 1 loss
Name: default_C1Loss
Description:
Serial No: SN 642-00113
Model:
Calibration Date: 3/24/3015
Cable 2 loss
Name: default_C2Loss
Description:
Serial No: SN 642-00112
Model:
Calibration Date: 3/24/3015
Cable 3 loss
Name: default_C3Loss
Description:
Serial No: SN 642-00114
Model:
Calibration Date: 3/24/3015
Instrument
SA Settings Name: 300 MHz
SA Serial No: B010217
Model: TEKTRONIX-RSA6120A
Calibration Date: 11/8/2015
Start Frequency: 50
Stop Frequency: 550
Frequency Step: 0.624219725343321
Frequency Units: MHz
AutoRBW: False
Resolution Bandwidth (RBW): 100 Hz
AutoVBW: True
Video Bandwidth (VBW): 5 Hz
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AutoAtt: True
Attenuation (dB): 25
Sweep Time (us): 0 us
Sweep Count: 1
Reference Level (dB): 0
EMITraceSize : 801
TraceSize : 801
TraceCompression : 0
ViewMode : RTSA_Mode
DetectionMode : PK+
FunctionMode : Normal
DPXFreqStep : 0
DPXDwellTime : 0
DPXDotPersistance : 0
Using probe calibration: StartF:50 StopF:550 probe Cf freq: 300 Cf_dB = 45.31.
Device Under Test (DUT)
Name: FPGA
Serial No.: 1
Width: 20 mm
Height: 20 mm
Reference Point Denso WT(X,Y,Z): 135.28 , 153.24 , 23.66
DUT Description: Lg Board
Measurement Profile
Profile Name: FPGA_Test
Number of layers: 1
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